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Perception: The seeing ear
Vincent Walsh
Some people perceive colours when they hear words —
a phenomenon known as synaesthesia. Brain imaging
techniques have revealed the areas of the cortex
involved in this rare mingling of the senses.
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We have all been green with envy, purple with rage, and
remembered golden years and dark times, and we all
dislike being in the red. For some people such descriptions
go beyond mere metaphor: the word ‘envy’ is green,
‘Monday’ really is blue and hearing the name of a bank
may make them literally see red. This phenomenon of per-
ceiving a colour when one hears words is the most common
example of the phenomenon of synaesthesia. Synaesthesia
is a rare but real phenomenon; it can be visual–tactile (per-
ceiving visual stimuli when touching objects), visual–gusta-
tory, tactile–visual or almost any combination of two
senses, but reports are dominated by visually-related
synaesthesias, and olfactory and gustatory synaesthesias are
less common. Two possible reasons for this are the proxim-
ity in the cortex of the visual areas to the auditory and
motor areas, the areas implicated in taste and olfaction
being relatively distant, and the fact that, of all senses,
vision dominates normal behaviour and is therefore more
likely to form associations with the other senses.
The veracity of the experience of synaesthesia has been
demonstrated beyond doubt [1] by presenting synaes-
thetes with lists of words, asking them to report which
colour they perceive for any given word and retesting
them, without warning, up to a year later. Remarkably the
synaesthetes maintain over 90 % consistency, whereas
non-synaesthetes who knew they would be retested main-
tained less than 40 % consistency after only one week.
Clearly, the synaesthetes do not make random associa-
tions, but experience particular colours for particular
words. The case histories of synaesthetic subjects also
show a high degree of consistency: the onset is in child-
hood and the specific colour–word associations do not
change over time. 
The nature of the colour–word associations made by
synaesthetes is surprising. One might imagine that the
colours perceived would be linked to some semantic
aspect of the word or perhaps the sound of the word. This
appears not to be the case. The link is not between
meaning and colour, or sound and colour, but between the
visual appearance of the first letter of the word and colour
[1–3]. Thus, a subject reporting the perception of red on
hearing the word ‘photograph’ would also report perceiv-
ing red on hearing the word ‘palladium’, but a different
colour on hearing the word ‘fish’. The experience is
described more accurately, then, as a colour–grapheme
association than as a colour–word association. This is not
so far removed from normal experience, in which one
makes a link between a spoken word and the letters in the
word. For example, it takes longer to decide that ‘enough’
and ‘bough’ do not rhyme than ‘rough’ and ‘how’.
The finding that the association is graphemic in
colour–word synaesthesia greatly constrains the possible
explanations of the experience. Grapheme perception is
not present at birth and only begins to develop when a
child is learning to write. This opens up the possibility that
colour–grapheme synaesthesia emerges at a time of
increased plasticity in the visual system, when it is
involved in learning to link letters with sounds and strings
of letters with objects. Evidence from neuropsychological
studies also points to the visual system. In 1893, Phillipe
(see [4]) reported that 30 out of 150 blind subjects
reported coloured-hearing after they had lost the sense of
sight, which is consistent with the remedial plasticity that
occurs following cortical damage [5]. Another patient who
was synaesthetic lost the experience after he suffered
brain damage resulting in cortical colour blindness [6].
These findings suggest that colour–grapheme synaesthesia
is dependent to some extent on activity within visually-
related cortical areas in which cells have response proper-
ties consistent with a role in the integration of features
such as colour and shape.
A different view [7] suggests that limbic areas are more
important for synaesthesia. A crucial part of the reasoning
behind this claim, however, lies in the argument that only
humans can make cross-modal associations, and that the
substrate for these is subcortical and unconscious. This is
mistaken on both counts. It is widely known that
monkeys [8], and of course apes [9], can make cross-
modal associations, and it is by no means clear that the
cortex is not involved. For example, Haenny et al. [10]
recorded from neurons in cortical visual area V4 while
monkeys were performing orientation discrimination
tasks, and found that many neurons responded to the
visual orientation of the stimuli, as one might expect from
this visual area [11], but that many were also sensitive to
the tactile orientation of a grooved plate if this was
relevant to the task. Further evidence implicating visual
areas in cross-modal transfer (Fig. 1) has come from a
study in which monkeys were impaired in the learning of
tactile–visual associations following lesions of the posterior
inferior temporal cortex [12].
Using positron-emission tomography (PET), Paulesu et al.
[3] have recently carried out a direct test of the hypothesis
that synaesthesia is based on sensory–sensory associations
in cortical circuits. PET detects changes in regional cere-
bral blood flow (thought to reflect neural activity) that are
associated with the performance of some task by human
subjects. The brain activities of six female synaesthetes
and six control subjects were compared on two tasks.
Subjects were blindfolded and presented with spoken
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Figure 1
The cortex of a macaque monkey, with visual
areas implicated in tactile–visual cross-modal
matching highlighted in colour: red, posterior
inferior temporal cortex (PIT); green, parieto-
occipital cortex (PO) and area 7a; yellow, V4.
PIT lies at the junction of the secondary visual
areas (V2, V3, V4 and V5), which are usually
associated with visual perception, and the
classical inferotemporal cortex, which may be
important for visual memory. PO and 7a
receive information from areas associated with
form and colour perception (V3 and V4) and
motion perception (V5).
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Cortical areas that showed activation during synaesthesia in the study
of Paulesu et al. [3]. Two lateral views of the human brain are shown;
numbers refer to Brodmann’s areas, which divide up the neocortex
according to differences in cellular structure. Areas activated in both
synaesthetes and control subjects during the presentation of words,
realtive to the presentation of pure tones, are coloured green. Areas
activated in the brains of synaesthetes relative to controls during the
presentation of words are coloured red.
words in one condition, and pure tones in a control condi-
tion. All the synaesthetes and none of the control subjects
experienced colour–grapheme synaesthesia during the
presentation of words. Three patterns of results were
observed (Fig. 2), as described below.
During the presentation of words, both groups of subjects
showed activation in brain areas involved in language —
Broca’s area (around Brodmann’s area 44 of the left hemi-
sphere), the superior temporal gyrus (Brodmann’s areas
21/22 of both hemispheres) and the middle temporal gyrus
area (Brodmann’s area 21 of both hemispheres). During
synaesthetic perception, the synaesthetes showed
increased activation relative to the controls in the parieto-
occipital junction (around the junction of areas 19 and 7)
of both hemispheres, the posterior inferior temporal cortex
of the left hemisphere (areas 20 and 37), the insula of the
right hemisphere, and the mid-frontal (areas 46 and 10),
inferior frontal (areas 44 and 9) and superior temporal (area
22) gyri of the right hemisphere. Deactivation was also
observed during coloured-hearing in some areas of the
synaesthetes’ brains — the insula of the left hemisphere
and the lingual gyrus (area 18) of the same hemisphere.
Interestingly, there was no significant increase in cerebral
blood flow in areas V1, V2 and V4, areas usually associated
with visual perception and in the case of V4 specifically
with colour [13].
Taken together, these observations suggest that the
experience of synaesthesia is mediated by a link between
the sound of the word, the appearance of the first letter of
the word and colour. Paulesu et al. [3] note that the poste-
rior inferior temporal cortex, where activation was
observed specifically during synaesthesic perception, is
an area in which form and colour are integrated, but this
leaves little room in their scheme for the contribution of
the parieto-occipital junction. They speculate on the pos-
sibility that parietal cortex may have some, unclear, role
in colour-related tasks, but a long history of investigations
into parietal damage in humans and monkeys suggests
another role. Damage to the parietal visual areas in
humans can produce an inability to discriminate whether
letters are presented in the correct orientation, and
lesions to the parietal visual areas in monkeys also cause
an inability to discriminate the correct orientation of
forms [14]. The increased blood flow observed in parietal
visual areas during synaesthesis may thus be related to
the form component of synaesthesia rather than the
colour component.
Whatever the origin of coloured-hearing it is certainly
more than a mere “confusion between the senses” [15],
and further studies may offer insights into aspects of plas-
ticity and cross-modal perception that may otherwise be
difficult to probe. Presumably we will hear more about
this if the visual imaging studies continue.
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